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THE NEW ZEALAND JURY
NEIL CAMERON,* SUSAN POTTER,** AND WARREN YOUNG***
I
INTRODUCTION
The colonial history of the courts in New Zealand is one of confusion and
often makeshift adaptation.  Legislative and ideological structures, including
those surrounding the venerable institution of the common law jury, often
meshed poorly with the realities of colonial society and everyday legal practice.
Initial attempts to accommodate or incorporate the interests and customs of
the majority indigenous population further clouded the picture.  These at-
tempts were largely nullified by settler antagonism and the cultural destruction
wrought by the colonisation process.
Jury trial in New Zealand dates back to the earliest years of colonisation
and initially represented an uninterrupted transmission of the English legal
heritage.  Both the Supreme Court and the lesser courts were established in
1841, the year following the formal annexation of the colony and its separation
from the Australian colony of New South Wales.  The new courts had their ju-
risdiction defined in terms of the existing jurisdiction of the English courts,
drew their personnel from English-born and -qualified practitioners, and oper-
ated according to English procedure.  Grand, common, special juries and even
the ancient aliens jury, de medietate linguae, were all pressed into service.
Not surprisingly, the colonists soon adapted the English traditions and
structures to the realities of their colonial setting.  In this article, we briefly
sketch the subsequent evolution of both the civil and criminal jury and of the
attempts to incorporate the indigenous Maori people within a set of notionally
separate arrangements which were nonetheless exclusively derived from Euro-
pean notions of criminal justice.  We then outline the current structures and the
issues and concerns that have emerged with some force over the last few years.
As with many common law jurisdictions that still retain trial by jury, the civil
jury in New Zealand is seldom used.  However, the criminal jury has undergone
something of a revival over the last decade and a half.  This, in turn, has gener-
ated concerns at the political, judicial, administrative, and public levels that are
currently being addressed by the New Zealand Law Commission and through a
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major research project that has been undertaken on behalf of the Commission.
In particular, over the last few years, attention has focused on issues including
the so-called “hung jury crisis” and the desirability of majority verdicts,1 the
availability of jury trial generally, the selection of jurors (especially the issue of
Maori representation on juries), the use of juries in complex cases, the provi-
sion of proper assistance to jurors both at trial and during the decisionmaking
process, and the problems of pretrial publicity and juror prejudice.
II
THE HISTORY OF JURY TRIAL IN NEW ZEALAND2
A. The Development of the Criminal Jury
The Supreme Court Ordinance of 1841 provided for a criminal jury of
twelve men for all cases tried on indictment.3  Sensibly, it also provided for any
criminal case to be tried by judge alone should the need arise.4  In the absence
of a grand jury in the infant colony, cases were to be commenced by the presen-
tation of an indictment under the signature of the Attorney General or a
Crown Prosecutor “as if the same had been presented by a grand jury.”5  At the
same time, the Sessions Courts Ordinance of 1841 constituted an intermediate
tier of Courts of General and Quarter Sessions, presided over by Justices,
which also had the jurisdiction to try indictable matters before a jury.6  Sum-
mary matters were heard by Justices sitting alone,7 or, from 1846, by a Resident
Magistrate.8
In 1858, the Sessions Courts were replaced by a system of District Courts
presided over by judges drawn from the practising legal profession.9  The Dis-
trict Court handled the less serious jury trials on indictment in those districts
for which they were proclaimed, while the Supreme Court dealt with the most
serious cases.10  The first major consolidating Act, the Juries Act of 1868, finally
introduced the grand jury as an intermediate step in Supreme Court cases, al-
though District Courts were left to proceed simply on the basis of an indict-
ment signed by the Attorney General or a Crown Prosecutor.11
                                                          
1. See, e.g., JOHN GOULTER, NO VERDICT: NEW ZEALAND’S HUNG JURY CRISIS (1997).
2. Surprisingly, there is very little information available on the history of jury trial in New Zea-
land.  For a brief but useful introductory discussion, see REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N ON THE
COURTS pt. 1 (AJHR Paper H2, 1978).
3. See Supreme Court Ordinance, 1841, § 19 (N.Z.).
4. See id. § 22.
5. Id. § 20.
6. See Sessions Courts Ordinance, 1841, § 6 (N.Z.).
7. See Summary Proceedings Ordinance, 1842, § 1 (N.Z.).
8. See Resident Magistrates Courts Ordinance, 1846, § 1 (N.Z.).
9. See District Courts Act, 1858, § 4 (N.Z.).
10. See id. § 29.
11. See id. § 145.
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In practice, District Courts were only ever declared in five districts of the
colony.12  Hence, although in theory there were three distinct levels of criminal
trial—one summary and two by jury—in most parts of the colony, the choice
was between summary trial in the Resident Magistrates’ Court and jury trial in
the Supreme Court.  By the end of the century, most District Courts had ceased
to function, their jurisdiction cannibalised by the Supreme Court and the emer-
gent Magistrates’ Courts.13  District Courts were effectively abolished in 1909
with the abolition of the court districts, although the 1858 Act itself was not fi-
nally repealed until 1925.14
Initially, eligibility for jury service in the Supreme Court, with the exception
of those working in certain occupations, was restricted to male residents be-
tween twenty-one and sixty years of age who held an estate in fee simple in
land or tenements.15  The chaotic state of land titles in the early years of the
colony, however, rendered the property qualification impractical, and as a tem-
porary expedient the Supreme Court initially adopted the solution arrived at in
the Sessions Courts Ordinance in 1841, whereby eligibility was based simply on
British citizenship and residence in the colony for six months or more.16  In any
event, the property qualification was never in fact implemented.
From the first Juries Ordinance in 1841, a wide range of political, legal, civil
service, and essential industries personnel were either disqualified or excused
from jury service.  These categories gradually expanded until most state em-
ployees could claim exemption.  Women were excluded until 1942, and even
then were not admitted on the same terms as men.17  Characteristically, settler
law also excluded Maori from the common jury,18 although “half-castes” not
living as part of a tribal group or community were classified as non-Maori for
this purpose.19  It was not until 1962, with the abolition of the last of the mixed
race jury provisions, that Maori became eligible for service on common juries,20
                                                          
12. These districts were Hawke’s Bay, Otago Goldfields, Taranaki, Timaru, and Westland.  See
REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N ON THE COURTS, supra note 2, at 9.
13. See Magistrates’ Courts Act, 1893, §§ 28-40 (N.Z.) (replacing the Resident Magistrates’ Courts
with Magistrates’ Courts).
14. See District Courts Abolition Act, 1925, § 2 (N.Z.).
15. See Juries Ordinance, 1841, § 1 (N.Z.).  The professions that were exempt from jury duty were
legislators, appointed officials, judges, ministerial officers, coroners, constables, full-pay military men,
clergymen, barristers, physicians, revenue officers, licensed pilots, and seamen.  See id.
16. See Supreme Court Ordinance, 1841, § 6 (N.Z.).
17. Women had to be at least 25 years old and under 60, and to serve had to notify the Sheriff in
writing of their desire to do so.  See Women Jurors Act, 1942, § 2 (N.Z.).  In comparison, men 21 to 65
years of age who were non-Maori were automatically eligible to serve.  See Juries Act, 1908, § 3 (N.Z.).
18. See Jury Amendment Ordinance, 1844, § 1 (N.Z.).
19. More fully, “Maori” was defined as including all persons of the “Aboriginal New Zealand
race, all Aboriginal Polynesian Melanesian and Australasian Natives, and all persons one of whose
parents was a Native of such race and which persons are herein designated ‘half-caste.’  Provided that
no half-caste shall be deemed to be a Maori for the purposes of this Act unless he shall be living as a
member of some Native tribe or community.”  Jury Law Amendment Act, 1862, § 2 (N.Z.).
20. See Juries Amendment Act, 1962, § 2 (N.Z.).
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and it was not until 1976 that women became eligible on the same terms as
men.21
In the Supreme Court, the cumbersome grand jury process—which required
a preliminary hearing before a magistrate or Justice to determine if there was a
prima facie case, followed by the laying of an indictment before the grand
jury,22 and then the empanelling of a common, special, or Maori jury to hear the
actual case—was abolished in 1961.23  Indeed, although we have no information
on the frequency of grand jury hearings prior to 1961, it seems likely that, be-
cause the preliminary hearing before the Justices effectively performed the
same task as the grand jury hearing, many cases in the Supreme Court already
largely bypassed the process.  At the same time, the criminal jurisdiction of the
Magistrates’ Court was progressively expanded—most radically in 1952.24  As a
result, by the early 1970s, although criminal jury trials continued to increase in
absolute terms,25 the proportion of defendants eligible for jury trial who actu-
ally elected it was in fact dropping rapidly.  By 1976, for example, only 0.24% of
those charged with criminal offences and 2.6% of those with the right to elect
trial by jury were actually being tried by jury.26
Nevertheless, the overall growth in the volume of criminal trials began to
produce problems for the Supreme Court.  In 1978, the Royal Commission on
the Courts recommended the creation of a new District Court structure to rein-
state elements of the old nineteenth century three-tier trial system and provide
for two distinct levels of jury trial.27  In the Commission’s view, a structural
change of this sort was clearly preferable to trying to cope with the problem
simply by appointing more judges and would enable a “reallocation of the
workload of the High Court and the District Courts so that judicial attributes
match case importance.”28  As a result, a series of statutory amendments in 1979
and 1980 renamed the Magistrate’s Court and the Supreme Court, which be-
came the District Court and the High Court respectively, and provided for
designated District Court judges to conduct jury trials in all but the most seri-
ous offences.29  In 1991, the process of removing criminal jury trials from the
                                                          
21. See Juries Amendment Act, 1976, § 2 (N.Z.).
22. For the procedure to select a grand jury, see Juries Act, 1908, §§ 51-60 (N.Z.).
23. See Crimes Act, 1908, § 407 (N.Z.).  These provisions were repealed by the Crimes Act, 1961
(N.Z.).  For a succinct description of the relevant legislative provisions and the process in practice, see
J.M.E. GARROW, THE CRIMES ACT 1908 (ANNOTATED) 185-86 (2d ed. 1927).
24. The Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1952 (N.Z.), empowered magistrates, with the consent of the
defendant, to try almost all indictable offences against property and all but the most serious sexual and
violent offences.  On summary conviction in such cases, the Magistrates’ Court was, however, limited
to the imposition of a maximum sentence of three years’ imprisonment, whatever the nominal maxi-
mum sentence for the offence.  See also REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N ON THE COURTS, supra note
2, at 12.
25. The increase in criminal jury trials sparked concerns that the seriousness of offending and the
greater availability of criminal legal aid had resulted in more defendants opting for jury trial.
26. See REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N ON THE COURTS, supra note 2, at 366.
27. See id. at 113.
28. Id. at 98.
29. For a review of this legislation, see R.A. McGechan, Trial by Triad—District Courts, Summary
Proceedings and Crimes Amendment (No. 2) Acts 1980, 10 N.Z. U. L. REV. 17 (1982).
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High Court was accelerated by dividing those remaining offences exclusively
within the High Court jurisdiction into two groups: a small group reserved only
for High Court trial and a rather larger group of so-called “middle band” of-
fences which, if the interests of justice or the demands of administrative con-
venience required it, could be transferred to the District Court for trial.30
The end product of this process has been the increasing simplification of the
criminal jury and its transfer from the High Court to the District Court.  At the
same time, although the overall use of criminal juries seems to have initially in-
creased with the introduction of jury trial in the District Court, the downward
trend in the proportion of cases going to jury trial has probably resumed over
the last couple of years.  Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to confirm
these impressions on the basis of the available data on jury trial in New Zea-
land.  While a crude ratio of jury trials to summary trials can be obtained, more
sophisticated data, such as the proportion of offenders eligible to elect jury trial
who actually elect it, are unobtainable at present.  It seems that jury trials make
up considerably less than one percent of total nontraffic criminal trials, and we
know that whereas in 1990 only fifty-seven percent of the committals were to
the District Court, by 1997 this had risen to seventy-eight percent; beyond that
the data are either unavailable or ambiguous.31
B. The Civil Jury
1.  Supreme/High Court Trial.  In addition to criminal cases tried on
indictment, the Supreme Court Ordinance of 1841 provided for a jury of twelve
men in all civil trials.32  As in the criminal jurisdiction, however, special
provisions were made for cases involving the indigenous inhabitants.  The
Jurors Ordinance of 1842 provided for the enrollment of Maori jurors to serve
on mixed race juries in actions in which one party was Maori.33  Not
surprisingly, this provision and similar attempts to accommodate the interests
of the majority population attracted considerable settler hostility and, as a
result, seems to have remained largely if not entirely a dead letter.34
The first general step away from jury trial at this level came in 1860 with the
provision that, with the consent of the parties, issues of fact could in the future
be tried by judge alone.35  In 1862, a system of “minor juries” was instituted to
deal with cases under £100 in value.  Minor juries consisted of six members
balloted from a panel of twelve and were used at the discretion of the trial
judge.36  By 1882, this had been reduced to a jury of four, available at the re-
                                                          
30. See District Courts Act, 1947, § 28A(1)(e) (N.Z.).
31. See Unpublished Statistics for June 1990 to June 1997, Dep’t for Courts, Wellington (on file
with authors).
32. See Supreme Court Ordinance, 1841, § 19 (N.Z.).
33. See Jury Law Amendment Act, 1862, § 9 (N.Z.).
34. See REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N ON THE COURTS, supra note 2, at 14.
35. See Supreme Court Amendment Act, 1860, § 22 (N.Z.).
36. See Supreme Court Amendment Act, 1862, § 7 (N.Z.).
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quest of either party, in cases involving sums of more than fifty pounds and less
than £500.37  The “minor jury” was finally abolished in 1977.38
Prior to 1880, civil juries essentially had to reach a unanimous verdict, as
they were discharged only if they failed to reach agreement after twelve hours’
deliberation.39  In 1898, this statute was amended to allow hung juries to be dis-
charged after a “reasonable” period of deliberation, provided that it was not
less than four hours.40  In the meantime, the Juries Act of 1880 had provided for
all civil juries to render a three-quarters majority verdict after a minimum of
three hours’ deliberation if unanimity could not be achieved.41  In 1980, the
minimum deliberation time was increased to four hours.42
At the same time as the power to conduct judge-alone trials was extended
and alternatives to the cumbersome jury of twelve were devised, the provision
of special juries was restricted and finally abolished.  Although special juries
seem to have been available since the inception of the Supreme Court in 1841,
formal recognition of their availability did not occur until 1844,43 and it was not
until 1868 that it was made clear that the parties could demand one as of right
in all civil cases.44  Nevertheless, by the Juries Act of 1908, a special jury could
be empanelled only by leave of the Court when a party petitioned, or alterna-
tively a judge could order it on a requirement of loosely defined “expert
knowledge.”45  In 1937, this requirement was tightened by limiting special juries
to cases in which the judge was satisfied that “difficult questions in relation to
scientific, technical, business or professional matters are likely to arise.”46  Spe-
cial juries could consist of either twelve or four jurors in the usual way.47  They
were abolished by the Juries Act of 1981.
In 1980, the Supreme Court became the High Court.48  The availability of
civil juries in the High Court is now governed by sections 19A and B of the Ju-
dicature Act of 1908.  In theory, jury trial is available in most civil trials at the
                                                          
37. See Supreme Court Act, 1882, sched. 2, cl. 251 (N.Z.).
38. See Judicature Amendment Act, 1977, § 9(i) (N.Z.).
39. See Juries Act, 1868, § 53 (N.Z.).
40. See Juries Amendment Act, 1898, § 13 (N.Z.).
41. See Juries Act, 1880, § 156 (N.Z.).
42. See Judicature Amendment Act, 1980, § 5 (N.Z.) (inserting a new § 54A that increased the de-
liberation time to four hours).
43. Prior to 1844, no specific rules relating to special juries existed in New Zealand.  In the ab-
sence of such rules, the Supreme Court followed the “practice of Her Majesty’s Superior Courts at
Westminster,” which included special juries at the request of the parties.  See Juries Amendment Or-
dinance, 1844, § 6 (N.Z.).  The Supreme Court Rules Ordinance of the same year formally recognised
such juries by providing for a Special Jury List to be compiled for use “[w]henever a special jury shall
be allowed by a Judge of the Supreme Court.”  Supreme Court Ordinance, 1844, §§ 74-75 (N.Z.).
44. See Juries Act, 1868, § 20 (N.Z.).
45. Juries Act, 1908, § 71 (N.Z.).
46. Statutes Amendment Act, 1937, § 37 (N.Z.).
47. See Juries Act, 1889, § 71 (N.Z.).
48. See Judicature Amendment Act, 1979, § 2 (N.Z.).  This legislation came into force on April 1,
1980.
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request of either party.49  In practice, it is so rare that the Department for
Courts no longer even keeps statistics on it.
2.  The District Court.  In 1858, a number of civil courts, presided over by
Justices of the Peace and Commissioners, were abolished and a simplified
three-tier trial court system was established.  Minor civil suits were to be heard
by Justices at Petty Sessions and by Resident Magistrates without benefit of
jury.50  Suits involving sums of not less than twenty pounds and not more than
£100 were to be heard in the District Court; more serious matters went to the
Supreme Court.51  At the District Court level, either party could require a jury
trial.  From the start, District Court juries consisted of only four members,52
selected by the parties from a panel of twelve by a series of alternating
challenges.53  By 1893, the jurisdiction of the District Court had been extended
to £500 but, as previously noted, District Courts had never been proclaimed in
all districts of the colony, and their civil business seems to have been gradually
usurped by the consent jurisdiction of the Resident Magistrates Court.  By the
time the Magistrates Courts Act of 1893 was enacted,54 District Courts had
largely ceased to function and were effectively abolished in 1909.55
When, in 1980, the Magistrates’ Court was redesigned and became the new
District Court with the ability to conduct jury trials in some criminal cases, the
civil side of its jurisdiction was left largely untouched.56  Hence, while criminal
trials may take place before a jury in either the District or the High Court, civil
jury trial is confined to the High Court.
C. The Trial of Maori Cases57
In 1841, the embryonic colonial administration had little claim or desire to
deal with the affairs of the indigenous population.  Settler Justices were initially
instructed simply to “compromise or adjust” minor disputes involving natives in
accordance with native custom.58  In theory at least, more serious matters were,
from the start, subject to settler law and procedure, but the practical realities of
                                                          
49. See Judicature Act, 1908, §§ 19A-19B (N.Z.).
50. See Petty Sessions of the Peace Act, 1858 (N.Z.); Resident Magistrates’ Courts Acts, 1858
(N.Z.).
51. See District Courts Act, 1858, § 15 (N.Z.).
52. See id. § 62.
53. See id. § 66.
54. The Magistrates Courts Act of 1893 replaced the Resident Magistrates Court with a court of
record presided over by a stipendiary magistrate.
55. In 1909, all the remaining court districts were abolished by proclamation.  The District Courts
Act, 1858, itself was not, however, formally repealed until 1925.  See REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N
ON THE COURTS, supra note 2, at 9.
56. See generally McGechan, supra note 29.
57. See generally REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N ON THE COURTS, supra note 2; ALAN WARD,
A SHOW OF JUSTICE: RACIAL “AMALGAMATION” IN NINETEENTH CENTURY NEW ZEALAND (1983).
58. See REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N ON THE COURTS, supra note 2, at 14.  Maori methods of
conflict resolution and the behavioural standards that informed them were almost always referred to in
colonial literature and legislation as “native custom,” thus clearly distinguishing it from the “legal”
codes and procedures of the European colonists.
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life in the emergent colony meant that few such cases came to notice.  Further-
more, from 1844 onward, minor civil disputes in which one or both parties were
Maori and criminal cases in which both parties were Maori were subject to spe-
cial procedures that made use of tribal authority structures and native asses-
sors.59  In addition, the Juries Amendment Ordinance of 1844 provided for
mixed race juries in both civil and criminal cases in all courts where jury trial
was available where “the property or person of any Aboriginal Native of New
Zealand may be affected.”60
Parallel to the development of the District Court in the “European” arena,
the Native Circuit Courts’ Act of 1858 provided for a system of Native Circuit
Courts to deal with disputes involving Maori in those districts in which native
land title had not yet been extinguished.  These courts were staffed by Resident
Magistrates—whose jurisdiction in the “European” domain was exclusively
judge alone—who sat with Maori assessors and, if the parties requested it, with
all-Maori juries in both civil and criminal cases.61  However, the potential im-
pact of these provisions was limited because they applied only in those outlying
districts for which they had been proclaimed by the Governor in Council.  In-
deed, even where they were in force, they are likely to have been a relatively
cost-free gesture toward indigenous justice, since it was clear that the govern-
ment-appointed Resident Magistrate was to largely control the process.62  Fur-
thermore, it seems likely that in some districts, at least, Maori juries were sel-
dom, if ever, used.  In any event, although the use of Maori assessors in civil
cases was retained in the Circuit Court until 1893, the provision for Maori juries
in civil cases was abolished in 1867.63  In criminal cases the jurisdiction of the
Native Circuit Court seems to have remained, at least in theory, until 1891,
when it was abolished as obsolete, like the District Court, its function usurped
by the Magistrates’ Court.64
In theory, all-Maori juries were available in both civil and criminal cases in
the Supreme Court.  In civil cases, Maori juries were available if both parties
were Maori and if both concurred.  In criminal cases, they were available if
both parties were Maori and the accused requested it.  In addition, in civil cases
where one party was Maori and requested an all-Maori jury, or both parties
were Maori and one wanted a Maori jury but the other did not, the court could
                                                          
59. See Native Exemption Ordinance, 1844 (N.Z.); see also Resident Magistrates’ Court Ordi-
nance, 1846 (N.Z.).
60. Juries Amendment Ordinance, 1844, § 1 (N.Z.).
61. See Native Circuit Courts’ Act, 1858, §§ 2, 6-10 (N.Z.).
62. For example, although the jury list was compiled by the native assessors, the initial panel of 12
was selected by the resident magistrate.  See id. § 6 (N.Z.).  Furthermore, on conviction by the jury, the
court was free to disregard the verdict if it thought fit, and, in the event of jury disagreement, the court
could simply decide the case itself.  See id. § 10.
63. See Resident Magistrates’ Act, 1867 (N.Z.).  This Act consolidated the powers of resident
magistrates but did not reenact the provisions of the Native District Courts Act, 1858, for Maori juries
in civil cases between Maori.
64. A process that culminated in the Magistrates’ Courts Act, 1893 (N.Z.), which repealed the
special provisions of the 1867 Act relating to Maori.
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order trial by a mixed jury composed of six jurors drawn from the Maori roll
and six from the common roll.65  We have little information on the extent to
which Maori and mixed juries were ever used.  However, a Maori or mixed jury
would be available only to the parties if Maori jurors were available on that
day.  As there was never any requirement that the authorities compile or main-
tain a Maori jury roll, and the legislation was always quite clear that if Maori
jurors were not available the jury could be drawn from the available common
jurors,66 the use of such juries probably was rare.  By the time of their abolition
in 1962, Maori juries were already described as obsolete—in spite of the fact
that an all-Maori jury had been used in a criminal trial the year before.67  The
abolition of Maori and mixed juries in 1962 accompanied the belated extension
to Maori of the right to sit on ordinary juries.68
In describing these structures, it may be correct to conclude, as the Report
of the Royal Commission on the Courts does, that
a principal thread of development during the nineteenth century involved a difficult
question of whether special tribunals, judicial officers, and rules should govern dis-
putes involving the Maori people; particularly in districts where the Maori formed a
majority population.  By the end of the century this issue had been settled, if not re-
solved.  Except in respect of Maori land and certain related matters, the Maori people
were to be governed almost completely by the English derived law.69
However, in so far as trial by jury was concerned, the issue was effectively
settled in the first few years of colonisation.  In practice, the provision of mixed
and Maori juries seems to have been little more than a perfunctory gesture in-
tended, at the most, to justify a system that progressively destroyed the indige-
nous legal structures while denying Maori the right to participate as full citizens
in the administration of the new system of justice to which they were to be
subjected.  Furthermore, as noted above, the extension of “special” procedures
to Maori always took place in the context of a system that was founded exclu-
sively on values derived from the English common law.  Indeed, the very con-
cept of the jury, generously extended to the Maori people by the colonial
authority, was a concept alien to the legal and social culture of the indigenous
race.
D. The Juries Act of 1981
The Juries Act of 1981 marks something of a watershed in the history of the
jury in New Zealand.  In particular, the Act significantly extended the demo-
cratic reach of the jury by sweeping away many of the old occupational exemp-
tions and limiting the grounds on which citizens could apply to be excused from
jury service.  Jury procedure was simplified and largely removed from the stat-
                                                          
65. The provisions dealing with Maori and mixed juries in both the civil and the criminal jurisdic-
tion were consolidated by the Juries Act, 1868, §§ 45-52 (N.Z.), and retained that form largely un-
changed until their abolition in 1962.
66. See Juries Act, 1868, § 50 (N.Z.).
67. See PETER WILLIAMS, A PASSION FOR JUSTICE 89-91 (1997).
68. See Juries Amendment Act, 1962, § 2 (N.Z.).
69. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N ON THE COURTS, supra note 2, at 2.
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ute into a comprehensive set of Jury Rules, thus reducing the length of the stat-
ute from 184 sections to thirty-seven.  Special juries were finally abolished, and
the jury of twelve was declared as the only form of jury available.
III
THE AVAILABILITY OF JURY TRIAL
A. Civil Trials
In any civil case heard in the High Court, section 19A of the Judicature Act
provides that either party may request a jury trial where the only relief claimed
is payment of a debt, pecuniary damages, or recovery of a chattel to the value
of more than $3,000.70  Where the case does not fall within section 19A, trial is
to be by judge alone unless the court orders otherwise on the ground that any
proceedings or issue “can be tried more conveniently” before a jury.71  The
right to jury trial under section 19A is, however, not absolute.  The judge may
still, on the application of either party, direct trial of the whole case or of any
particular issue before a judge alone if one of two conditions are satisfied:  The
case or issue involves the consideration of difficult questions of law, or the case
involves the prolonged examination of documents or accounts or difficult ques-
tions of a scientific, technical, business, or professional nature which “cannot
conveniently be made with a jury.”72
For most of its history, the use of the civil jury in New Zealand, while not
rare, has been limited to a number of specific types of case.  Since the turn of
the century, its use has largely been confined to defamation and personal injury
cases, and the occasional action against governmental bodies, such as the po-
lice.  The effective abolition of the vast majority of personal injury actions in
1972 (and their replacement with a comprehensive “no-fault” state-
administered compensation scheme) has now relegated the civil jury to only
one or two cases per year.73  While recent changes to the accident compensation
scheme may have begun to open the door to a revival of some forms of per-
                                                          
70. See Judicature Act, 1908, § 19A(1)-(2) (N.Z.), amended by Judicature Act, 1977, § 6 (N.Z.).
The $3,000 lower limit means that in practice all damages claims that are likely to reach the court will
be eligible for jury trial—what research we have indicates that the minimum level at which litigation
through the courts becomes economic is $15,000.  This is undoubtedly an understatement.  See REPORT
OF THE NEW ZEALAND JUDICIARY 16 (1997).
71. Judicature Act, 1908, § 19B(2) (N.Z.).
72. Id. § 19A(5).  However, the High Court has recently confirmed that § 19A does not confer a
“general discretion” on the court in this area.  Even though a trial would “be much more sensibly, eco-
nomically and conveniently managed and conducted before a judge alone,” a jury trial cannot be re-
fused unless the factors specifically identified in § (5)(a)-(b) are made out by the party resisting trial by
jury.  M & Ors v. L & Ors [Mar. 3, 1998] High Court, Auckland Registry, CP. 226-229/96, CP. 279-
80/96, at 23 (unreported).
73. In 1960, civil jury trials accounted for 35.75% of the total civil actions heard in the Supreme
Court.  By 1976, after three years of operation of the accident compensation scheme, see Accident
Compensation Act, 1972, §§ 4-5 (N.Z.), the number had fallen to 12.65%.  See REPORT OF THE ROYAL
COMM’N ON THE COURTS, supra note 2, at 125-26.
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sonal injury action, the High Court seems likely to adopt a cautious approach
to the application of jury trial under such instances.74
The future of the civil jury is unclear.  On the one hand, if personal injury
claims and, in particular, exemplary damages and Bill of Rights Act claims are
permitted to develop,75 plaintiffs may well continue to press for jury trial.  On
the other hand, neither defendants nor the judiciary are likely to evince much
enthusiasm for the process.  However, given the iconic status of jury trial in
general, there is unlikely to be much enthusiasm for outright abolition, either.
The likelihood seems to be that New Zealand will continue to retain a theoreti-
cal right to jury trial in civil cases, which will continue to be rarely, if ever, exer-
cised effectively.
B. Criminal Trials
Criminal offences in New Zealand can be divided into two basic categories:
the more serious indictable offences, which can be tried on indictment before a
judge and jury, and the lesser summary offences, which can be tried summarily
before a District Court Judge or before Justices.  The picture is, however, com-
plicated by the fact that many indictable offences also can be tried summarily
and that some summary offences may, if the accused so elects, be tried on in-
dictment.  In broad terms, therefore, a case may proceed to jury trial for one of
three reasons: it involves an offence which by statute is laid on indictment; it
involves an offence which may be laid either summarily or on indictment but
which the prosecution has chosen to lay indictably; or the charge has been laid
summarily but the accused has exercised a right to elect jury trial.
Jury trial may take place either before a District Court presided over by a
trial judge76 or before the High Court.  The District Court has jurisdiction to
conduct jury trials in the following situations:
(1) where the accused elects trial by jury, having either been
charged with a summary offence carrying a maximum penalty in excess
of three months imprisonment,77 or with an indictable offence in which
the prosecution has chosen to proceed in summary form;78
                                                          
74. See, for example, the comments of Elias, J., in Innes v. Attorney-General [1997] 4 H.R.N.Z.
251, 256.
75. Currently, the view of the Court of Appeal is that public law compensation under the Bill of
Rights Act is not “pecuniary damages” and is accordingly not covered by the “right” conferred by
§i19A of the Judicature Act of 1908.  In addition, the consideration of compensatory damages is not
appropriate for jury determination and accordingly should not be ordered under § 19B.  See Simpson v.
A-G (Baigent’s Case) [1994] 3 N.Z.L.R. 667, 677.
76. That is, a District Court Judge appointed by the Governor-General under § 28B of the District
Courts Act of 1947 to exercise the jurisdiction of the District Court in respect to trials on indictment.
77. See Summary Proceedings Act, 1957, § 66(1) (N.Z.); see also New Zealand Bill of Rights Act,
1990, § 24(e) (N.Z.).  There are a few notable exceptions to this right.  The offences of common assault
and assault on a law enforcement officer under sections 9 and 10 of the Summary Offences Act of
1981, which both carry a maximum penalty of six months’ imprisonment, can only be tried summarily.
78. Those indictable offences in respect of which the prosecution may choose to proceed either on
indictment or summarily are listed in section 6(2) and in the First Schedule of the Summary Proceed-
ings Act of 1957.
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(2) where the accused has been charged with an indictable offence
which may be laid summarily but the prosecution elects to proceed by
way of indictment;
(3) where the accused has been charged with one of the twenty-
seven offences listed in Part I of Schedule 1A of the District Courts
Act of 1947.79  These offences comprise a band of the less serious of-
fences under the Crimes Act of 1961 and are triable only on indict-
ment;
(4) where the accused has been charged with one of the seventeen
so-called “middle band” offences listed in Part II of Schedule 1A of the
District Courts Act of 1947, such as rape, kidnapping, and wounding
with intent, and the proceedings have been transferred from the High
Court to the District Court following a determination by a High Court
Judge on the papers that in the interests of justice or administrative
convenience it is more appropriate for the trial to be held in the Dis-
trict Court.80
The High Court has jurisdiction to try all indictable offences and all of-
fences where the accused is proceeded against summarily and elects jury trial.
However, in practice most of these cases now proceed to the District Court and
the High Court will hear cases only in the following situations:81
(1) where the offence falls in the “middle band” and a High Court
Judge has determined that trial in the District Court is not appropriate;
(2) where the offence is indictable and is neither triable summarily
nor listed as a “middle band” offence in Part II of Schedule 1A of the
District Courts Act of 1947.  This small group of offences, all carrying
maximum penalties of fourteen years imprisonment or more, essen-
tially comprises the most serious offences in the Crimes Act of 1961
and must be tried in the High Court;
(3)  where, on the application of either party, a High Court Judge
orders the transfer of the case from the District Court.
Although trials on indictment at both levels still generally involve jury trial,
in all but a relatively small number of offences, the accused may now apply for
trial by judge alone.82  There is a statutory presumption in favour of granting
the application,83 and the courts have taken the view that, in general, the ac-
cused is to be seen as the best judge of the situation.84  Unlike a number of
other jurisdictions, there is no requirement that the prosecution consent to the
                                                          
79. District Courts Act, 1947, § 28A(1)(d) (N.Z.).
80. See id. § 28A(1)(e); Summary Proceedings Act, 1957, § 168A(a)(1) (N.Z.).
81. See District Courts Act, 1947, § 28J(1)-(2) (N.Z.).
82. See Crimes Act, 1961, § 361B (N.Z.).  An application for trial by judge alone may not be made
where the accused is charged with an offence punishable by imprisonment for life or a term of 14 years
or more, such as homicide or sexual violation.  See id. § 361B(5).
83. See id. § 361B(4).
84. See R. v. Narain [1988] 1 N.Z.L.R. 580, 589.
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application, nor is there any requirement that the accused obtain legal advice
prior to the application.
In practice, whether an accused is tried by jury, and, to a lesser extent,
where the trial takes place, depends on a number of factors and distinctions
which frequently seem arbitrary.  These factors range from the maximum pen-
alty for the offence charged, whether the offence is classified as summary or in-
dictable (which may well be largely a matter of historical accident), the form
(summary or indictable) in which the prosecution has chosen to commence the
proceedings, and whether the accused elects to be tried by jury or seeks trial by
judge alone.  The result is that offenders who have committed similar offences
can have very different levels of control over the form and venue of their trial,
as well as the potential penalties to which they will be exposed.
Leaving aside the question of the availability of trial by jury in complex or
otherwise exceptional cases,85 the current rules as to the availability of jury trial
raise a number of distinct issues.  First, as noted above, the present law pro-
vides for mandatory jury trial in all cases where the maximum penalty is four-
teen years imprisonment or more.86  While there are certainly good arguments
for a presumption of jury trial in such cases,87 it is difficult to see a justification
for a blanket rule that applies whether the case raises issues which are particu-
larly appropriate to jury resolution.  We would accordingly agree with the New
Zealand Law Commission in its recently published discussion paper on criminal
jury trials when it suggests that in all such cases it should in the future be left to
the accused to assess whether jury trial is the appropriate forum for the case.88
Secondly, as noted above,89 although the Summary Proceedings Act pro-
vides for an accused to have the right to elect jury trial in a civilian court if
charged with an offence punishable by more than three months’ imprisonment,
and although this right is confirmed by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act of
1990,90 persons charged with either assault or assault on a law enforcement offi-
cer face a maximum penalty of six months imprisonment and yet may not elect
trial by jury.91  While the precise rationale for this exclusion is unclear, the High
Court has recently linked it to “the view that the [c]ourt system could not ac-
commodate the luxury of jury trials for the very common type of prosecution
for assault suitably brought under the Summary Offences Act.”92  The logic of
                                                          
85. See infra Part III.C.
86. See supra text in note 82.
87. See, for example, the comments of Williams, J., in R. v. Maguire [Dec. 8, 1992] High Court,
Auckland Registry, T. 267/90, at 3 (unreported), the VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, JURY
SERVICE IN VICTORIA ¶ 2.27 (Issues Paper No. 2, 1995), and, in relation to murder, the comments of
White, J., in R. v. Marshall [1986] 43 S.A. St. R. 448, 449.
88. See NEW ZEALAND LAW COMM’N, JURIES IN CRIMINAL TRIALS PART ONE, at 22-30 (1998).
89. See supra text accompanying note 77.
90. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990, § 24(c) (N.Z.).  This section also provides, however,
that there is no right to a jury trial where the offence is under military law and tried before a military
tribunal.  See id.
91. See Summary Offences Act, 1981, § 43 (N.Z.).
92. Reille v. Police [1993] 1 N.Z.L.R. 587, 591.
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the exclusion of these two offences from the right recognised in the Bill of
Rights is not compelling.  If the offence is properly considered to be a minor
one for which summary trial is appropriate, then it should be visited only with
the generally accepted “minor” penalty of three months imprisonment or less.
If it is a serious offence which merits a potential penalty of six months impris-
onment, then, like similar offences in that penalty range, it should attract the
right to jury trial.  In its discussion paper, the New Zealand Law Commission
proposes the repeal of section 43 of the Summary Offences Act of 1981 to rem-
edy this anomaly.93  Although we agree with the Commission’s criticism of the
provision, and although we recognise the political difficulties involved, it would
be preferable in our view to deal with the anomaly by reducing the maximum
penalty for the offences in question to three months imprisonment, thus ren-
dering section 43 redundant.
Thirdly, the current system, whereby a large number of offences are prima
facie indictable but may, at the discretion of the police, be charged either in-
dictably or summarily, enables the police to dictate jury trial in circumstances
where the accused might well prefer the case to be tried by judge alone.  At
present there are no guidelines, legislative or otherwise, for the exercise of this
discretion, and little or no input into police decisionmaking by the Crown
Prosecutor, who, if the case does eventually go to trial before a jury, will be re-
sponsible for drawing up the indictment and presenting the case in court.  As a
result, practice seems to vary considerably between police districts and even
police investigators within the same district,94 with the decision being made
primarily on the basis of the individual officer’s perception of the seriousness of
the accused’s conduct.
While the prosecution will always have a choice over the precise charge to
lay, and this may sometimes dictate the mode of trial and limit the choices
available to the accused, permitting the prosecution to determine directly the
mode of trial by choosing the form in which the charge is laid is anomalous.
This is a view which has been consistently taken by the New Zealand Law
Commission and is repeated in its current discussion paper on criminal jury tri-
als.95  In our view, this power should be removed and the offences currently
subject to it treated simply as summary offences.  Hence, the accused would re-
tain the right to elect jury trial and, where the accused declines this right, the
court would retain the residual power to decline summary jurisdiction where
appropriate.96
If it is accepted that a blanket provision for mandatory jury trial is inappro-
priate, not least because crude statutory criteria based on maximum sentence
                                                          
93. See NEW ZEALAND LAW COMM’N, supra note 88, ¶ 128.
94. See WARREN YOUNG ET AL., NEW ZEALAND DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION AND
TRIAL OF ADULT OFFENDERS IN NEW ZEALAND 23-26 (1989); see also NEW ZEALAND LAW
COMM’N, CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 40-41 (1997).
95. See NEW ZEALAND LAW COMM’N, THE STRUCTURE OF THE COURTS (1989).
96. See Summary Proceedings Act, 1957, § 44 (N.Z.).  This enables the court, for example, to deal
with the situation where defendants in multiple defendant trials choose different modes of trial.
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length or general offence categories are essentially arbitrary in their operation,
and that the prosecution generally should not have the power to dictate the
mode of trial, the historical distinction between indictable and summary of-
fences becomes largely irrelevant.  Consistent with the provisions of the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act, offences carrying three months imprisonment or
less should continue to be triable summarily.  All other offences should also be
triable by a judge alone unless the defence elects trial by jury.  As in the civil
jurisdiction, it may, however, be desirable to give the court power to decline
jury trial in cases of particular complexity.97
C. Jury Trial in Complex Cases
The principal debate in relation to criminal cases is whether the right to jury
trial should be removed in some or all complex cases.  At present, there is no
provision in New Zealand law for complex trials, such as fraud cases, to be tried
automatically by judge alone, or indeed by any other form of special tribunal.
It is the defendant’s decision whether to make an application for a judge-alone
trial.98
This procedure was inserted into the Crimes Act in 1979 in response to con-
cern expressed by the Court of Appeal that in complex fraud cases some
mechanism was needed to permit trial by judge alone.99  More recently, the dif-
ficulties experienced by the judge and parties in R. v. Adams,100 otherwise
known as “the Equiticorp case,” led the trial judge to observe that such trials
should never be tried by jury.101  In this case, seven company directors were ac-
cused on an indictment containing thirteen counts of fraud.  All the defendants
applied for, and were granted, trial by judge alone.  The trial lasted six months,
and the Crown called 105 witnesses who testified.  An additional ninety wit-
nesses presented written briefs to the court.  The evidence raised complex fac-
tual issues and difficult points of civil and criminal law.
The problems produced by complex and often lengthy cases have been con-
sidered by both the New Zealand Law Commission and reform bodies in a
number of other commonwealth jurisdictions.  Most recently, the English gov-
ernment has published a consultation document outlining various alternatives
to trial by jury in complex cases.102
Proponents of judge-alone trials in these cases argue that such a procedure
is desirable because juries are not competent to cope with complex and exten-
                                                          
97. See infra Part III.C.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
99. See R. v. Jeffs & Others [Apr. 28, 1978] (Court of Appeal), quoted in REPORT OF THE ROYAL
COMM’N ON THE COURTS, supra note 2, ¶ 399.  The legislation enacted did not follow the Royal
Commission’s recommendation in paragraph 400 that the defendant be able to elect trial by judge
alone and that the Crown be able to object to that election.
100. [Dec. 18, 1992] High Court, Auckland Registry, T 240/91 (unreported).
101. See NEW ZEALAND LAW  COMM’N, supra note 88, at 40.
102. See HOME OFFICE, JURIES IN SERIOUS FRAUD TRIALS: A CONSULTATION DOCUMENT
(1998).
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sive evidence, often from expert witnesses, especially where the case extends
over a lengthy period of time.  However, professional opinion on this is divided,
in terms of both the nature of the problem and its significance.  Furthermore,
what research we have is equivocal.  While some “complex” cases undoubtedly
produce perverse jury verdicts through the failure of juries to understand the
evidence, this is likely to be true for some noncomplex cases as well.  On the
other hand, the provision of special judge-alone or specialist tribunal regimes
for a limited range of predominantly white collar offences runs the risk of giv-
ing the appearance of the establishment “looking after its own” or conversely,
of an establishment exercise in scapegoating.  In other words, such cases, how-
ever defined, may well be precisely the ones in which the political or symbolic
value of the jury as an avenue for community input is most significant.  Moreo-
ver, it may be that at least some of the difficulties juries confront in such cases
result from aspects of trial procedure, such as the way in which evidence is pre-
sented, the lack of explanation of legal terms, unhelpful or untimely judicial in-
structions, and reliance on oral proceedings.103
Notwithstanding these considerations, there is a strong argument that some
cases are simply unsuited to the jury process.  The problem lies in defining
which cases fall into this category.  Fraud trials are not the only kind of com-
plex trial, and as a blanket category, not all fraud trials are automatically com-
plex.  Scientific evidence may make a murder trial complex and the evidence
difficult to understand, or myths regarding female sexuality in a rape trial may
cloud issues of consent and sexual behaviour.  It would be neither possible nor
desirable, therefore, to eliminate the problem of complex trials solely by refer-
ence to the offence category or the length of trial.  It would be possible to do so
only by giving judges the discretion to order a judge-alone trial where they be-
lieve that, because of the complexity of the case, a jury trial would be contrary
to the interests of justice.  Although, if implemented, the exercise of such dis-
cretion would likely become a fruitful area for pretrial litigation or appeals, it
would go a long way toward eliminating the problems that stem from trial by
jury in complex cases.
IV
THE SELECTION OF JURORS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
A. Eligibility for Jury Service
Prior to the selection of the jury at court, a number of legal rules determine
who is able to serve on a jury.  The Juries Act of 1981 states positively that reg-
istered electors between twenty and sixty-five years of age are qualified to
serve on juries within the jury district in which they reside.104  This includes
                                                          
103. How procedures in these respects might be modified to enhance jury decisionmaking is dis-
cussed infra, text following note 173.
104. See Juries Act, 1981, § 6 (N.Z.).
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noncitizens who are permanent residents and are registered on the electoral
rolls.105
As in other jurisdictions, those individuals with a close connection to either
the administration of the law or the criminal justice system cannot serve.106
Such individuals excluded from service include members of the Executive
Council of New Zealand, Members of Parliament, judges, certain Justices of
the Peace, barristers and solicitors, police officers,107 and certain employees in
the justice system.  Persons who have been convicted of a criminal offence and
imprisoned108 for life or a term of three years or more, or sentenced to preven-
tive detention, are also disqualified from serving on a jury, as are those who,
within the last five years, have been either imprisoned for three months or
more or sentenced to corrective training.109
B. The Out-of-Court Selection Process
The first step in the selection process is the compilation, by random selec-
tion, of jury lists from the General and Maori electoral rolls for each jury dis-
trict.110  From the jury lists, a number of potential jurors are randomly selected
by the Court Registrars of individual courts (the jury panel) and sent a sum-
mons to appear in court for jury service.  Jurors are summoned to appear at the
beginning of the working week (usually Monday morning) and must remain
available to be selected for any jury commencing during that week.  The Regis-
trar may ask potential jurors not selected on the first day, or persons who serve
on a jury for one or two days, to return later in the week for another jury em-
panelment.  Summoned potential jurors may apply to the Registrar to be ex-
cused from jury service.  The Registrar may grant that application if
(1)  the potential juror, another person, or the general public may
suffer a serious inconvenience or hardship because of the nature of the
person’s occupation or business or any commitment arising from it, or
because of the person’s health, family commitments, or other personal
circumstances;
(2)  the potential juror has either served as a juror or attended for
jury service within the last two years;
                                                          
105. See Electoral Act, 1993, § 74 (N.Z.).
106. See Juries Act, 1981, § 8 (N.Z.).
107. There is no statutory prohibition on former police officers serving on juries, but in practice
counsel apply for the discharge of the juror or the jury if such information comes to hand.  See, e.g., R.
v. Ryder (No. 3) [Sept. 28, 1994] unreported, High Court, Christchurch, T 68/94; R. v. Turner [July 25,
1996] Court of Appeal, CA 439/95 (unreported).
108. Prior to 1981, section 5 of the Juries Act, 1908 (N.Z.) disqualified people who had been con-
victed of any offence punishable by death or imprisonment for a term of three years or more.
109. See Juries Act, 1981, § 7 (N.Z.).
110. The Juries Act, 1981 (N.Z.), and the Jury Rules, S.R. 1990, No. 226 (N.Z.), set out the system
for selecting persons for jury service.  The Electoral Enrolment Centre compiles the jury lists and the
Department for Courts screens the lists for potential jurors who may be disqualified.  A jury district is
defined arbitrarily as those places within 30 kilometres by the most practicable route from a court-
house in the town or city in which jury trials may be held.  See Juries Act, 1981, § 5(3) (N.Z.).
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(3)  the potential juror has been excused from jury service for a pe-
riod that has not yet expired; or
(4)  the potential juror is a member of a religious sect or order that
holds jury service to be incompatible with its beliefs.111
Potential jurors are excused fairly readily on these grounds.  A survey con-
ducted by the then-Department of Justice in 1993112 found that only twenty-six
percent of persons summoned appeared in court for jury service;113 fifty-six per-
cent were excused by the Registrar before or on the day of court;114 and the re-
maining eighteen percent did not turn up, either because they ignored the
summons or because residential or postal addresses were out of date.115
Excusing more than half of the summoned potential jurors from jury service
has a significant impact on the representation of particular community groups.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that professional groups, teachers, the self-
employed, and women at home with children are particularly likely to be ex-
cused.  Similarly, the significant numbers who fail to turn up without contacting
the court are no doubt drawn disproportionately from some groups—probably
the unskilled and the highly mobile.
Consequently, of the quarter of summoned jurors who turn up for jury
service, some demographic groups are seriously under-represented compared
to the jury district population.  In particular, in the Trial by Peers study, Maori,
Maori women, women in general, and younger age groups were under-
represented.  Five out of the ten occupational groups had lower than expected
proportions in the jury panel (“legislators, administrators and managers,”
“professionals,” “agriculture and fishery workers,” “trades,” and “elementary
occupations”).  The difference between the expected and actual proportion was
most striking for the elementary occupations.116
Under-enrollment of eligible voters, a significant proportion of whom are
Maori and Pacific Islanders compared with the general electorate, is being ad-
dressed by the Electoral Enrolment Centre by the use of special enrolment
campaigns.
Based on the assumption that jury representativeness is a desirable goal, it
appears that the proportions either being excused or failing to turn up pose a
significant problem.  It may not be worth tackling the problem of “no-shows”;
many fail to turn up because their addresses on the electoral roll are out of
date, and it would be time-consuming, difficult, and resource-intensive to bring
                                                          
111. See id. § 15.
112. See NEW ZEALAND DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TRIAL BY PEERS?: THE COMPOSITION OF THE NEW
ZEALAND JURY 45-54 (1995) [hereinafter TRIAL BY PEERS].  The period surveyed was September 13
to October 8, 1993.
113. Even this figure may still be too high.  Other data collected by the Department for Courts in-
dicate that the figure is more likely to be around 20%-22%.  See id. at 42.
114. This group included anyone who was disqualified or ineligible to serve and who informed the
Registrar of this fact.
115. See TRIAL BY PEERS, supra note 112, at 42.
116. This classification included labourers, cleaners, building caretakers, messengers, door-keepers,
and refuse collectors.  See id.
CAMERON.FMT3.DOC 08/02/99  4:09 PM
Page 103: Spring 1999] NEW ZEALAND 121
successful prosecutions against those who deliberately ignore the summons.
The existing liberal policy in relation to excuses, however, is another matter;
for citizens to take jury service seriously as a duty for which they should make
themselves available, it is untenable to operate a system which excuses more
than half of those called upon.  Mindful of this problem, the Department for
Courts is at present conducting research on excusing jurors, and will be investi-
gating the usefulness of providing guidelines to court registrars.  It remains to
be seen whether this will prove to be enough to remedy the problem.
C. Selection at Court
Upon arrival at court, summoned jurors normally have their attendance
noted by a court official and are then shown an introductory video.117  They are
also told, in a number of languages, that they must be able to speak and under-
stand English, and if they do not, they are excused by the Registrar.118
There is an initial ballot for each jury trial commencing on that day which
selects about thirty potential jurors for the case.  Those thirty or so jurors are
then taken to the courtroom.  Before final balloting, counsel read the full
names of the defendant(s) and all witnesses to be called by the prosecution and
the defence, and the potential jurors are asked to disclose whether they know
any of the people whose names have been read out and, if so, the nature of that
knowledge.  The judge then decides whether to excuse any potential juror on
the basis of such personal knowledge.119  Following that, there is a final ballot to
select the twelve jurors who will serve on the case.
As each juror is called, they may be challenged by prosecution or defence120
before they sit down in the jury box, or they may be directed by the judge to
“stand by.”121  There are three different types of challenges: challenge for want
of qualification, challenge for cause, and peremptory challenge.  Before we
consider each of these, however, it should be noted that information upon
which challenges can be based is very limited.
Any party to the proceedings can request that the Registrar make available
a copy of the jury panel for inspection or copying up to five working days be-
fore the jurors are due to be summoned for the week in which the proceedings
are scheduled to start.122  Any other person may inspect and copy the jury panel
during the same period with the court’s permission.123  However, the panel list is
drawn from the electoral roll entry and lists only names, addresses, and occupa-
                                                          
117. See infra text accompanying notes 167-169.
118. Although Registrars have no specific powers to excuse on this ground, it is likely that they can
do so within the general terms of the statutory provision giving them the power to excuse jurors.  See
Juries Act, 1981, § 15(1)(b) (N.Z.).
119. See id. § 16(b).
120. See id. § 19.
121. See id. § 27.  Jurors who are stood by (either by consensus between the parties or on the
judge’s own motion if he or she believes that there is a difficulty with that juror) may be recalled if the
number of potential jurors is exhausted before a panel of 12 has been selected.
122. See id. § 14(1).
123. See id. § 14(2).
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tions.  In addition, in most centres, the police provide the prosecution with in-
formation on each potential juror’s previous criminal convictions.  In a few
cases, the police officer in charge of the case will also go through the prosecu-
tion’s jury list to see if there is anybody he or she does not want on the jury.
The police may also annotate the jury list to indicate that a potential juror is an
associate of repeat offenders.
The defence has more limited resources with which to check out the jury.
Counsel may review the jury list with their client to see if any person should be
excluded.  At times, information from the jury list is also discussed.  In smaller
centres, counsel may make use of personal contacts, or may try to discover in-
formation on potential jurors by circulating the jury list around the office.
Hence, although jury vetting is not prohibited, the reality is that the scope
for it is very limited.  Furthermore, only in exceptional circumstances may a
judge allow counsel to cross-examine jurors before they take their seats.124  In-
deed, there is no reported New Zealand case in which such questioning has
been permitted, and in practice it does not occur.  The effective absence of a
voir dire procedure at this stage, coupled with the very restricted nature of any
vetting that might take place, means that in the vast majority of cases, there is
little or no opportunity to assess the knowledge, attitudes, and prejudices of po-
tential jurors prior to challenge.
1. Challenge for Want of Qualification.  While all jury lists are screened by
the Department for Courts with regard to disqualifications and exclusions,
counsel for both prosecution and defence are entitled to challenge any balloted
potential juror “for want of qualification,” that is, on the basis that sections 6-8
of the Juries Act of 1981 prevent the person from serving.  This kind of
challenge occurs very rarely125—presumably because either the pretrial
screening process is generally effective or nobody at court is aware of the
features that may disqualify a juror under these sections.
2. Challenge for Cause.  The prosecution and defence may challenge
potential jurors for cause on the ground that they are not “indifferent between
the parties.”  By virtue of section 25 of the Juries Act of 1981, such challenges
are to be determined by the Judge in private and in such manner and on such
evidence as he or she thinks fit.  Because of the absence of information upon
which to determine whether such bias exists, challenges for cause are also very
rare.  The Trial by Peers study recorded none, and as far back as 1957, the
Court of Appeal described them as obsolete.126  Where possible prejudice may
exist—for example, because the potential juror is known to be an associate of
repeat offenders—he or she is instead subject to a peremptory challenge.
                                                          
124. See R. v. Sanders [1995] 3 N.Z.L.R. 545, 549.
125. None was recorded in the Trial by Peers study.  See TRIAL BY PEERS, supra note 112.
126. See R. v. Greening [1957] N.Z.L.R. 906, 914.
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Rather oddly, other grounds available at common law on which a juror
could be challenged for cause, such as intoxication, the impersonation of a ju-
ror, or an inability to understand the language in which the trial is being con-
ducted, are not available under the Juries Act of 1981.  If such cases occur,
counsel must rely on using a peremptory challenge or the stand-by procedure.127
The latter option is not entirely satisfactory, however, since the person stood by
may still be called for jury service if there are no prospective jurors left and the
jury does not yet number twelve.  In that case, the judge would have to rely on
the court’s inherent jurisdiction to discharge the juror.128
3. Peremptory Challenge.  The prosecution or defence may also challenge a
limited number of potential jurors without the need to give any reason for
doing so.  Generally, the prosecution and defence may each challenge six
potential jurors in this way.  In trials involving more than one defendant, the
Crown has a maximum of twelve challenges, while defence counsel may
challenge six potential jurors for each defendant.  It appears that defence
counsel challenge twice as often as prosecutors.129  There is no law prescribing
the proper and nondiscriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges; they may
be exercised on any basis and are not open to scrutiny or objection.
Peremptory challenges are sometimes exercised by prosecution counsel on
the basis of information about criminal convictions or criminal associations
provided to them by the police.  Because of the absence of other information
about the background and attitudes of potential jurors, such challenges are
usually based on perceived age, address, occupation, gender, ethnicity, general
appearance, and demeanour.  The stereotypes derived from these characteris-
tics—for example, that manual or trade workers are more likely to be pro-
defence than professional or service occupations, and that schoolteachers cause
hung juries130—have little or no empirical foundation.  It must therefore be con-
cluded that, for the most part, the peremptory challenge in New Zealand is in
essence exercised arbitrarily.
Once the jury pool has been assembled at court, the peremptory challenge
is the most significant courtroom procedure affecting the composition, and
hence the representativeness, of juries.  The Trial by Peers study in 1993 found
that, compared to the jury pool
(1)  fewer Maori men served on District Court juries, while the ex-
pected proportion served on High Court juries;
(2)  men, and particularly Maori men, were under-represented;
                                                          
127. See J.N. Finn, Aspects of the Law Relating to Jury Trials, 2 CANTERBURY L. REV. 206, 206-07
(1984).
128. See id. at 207.  Although there is no authority on the matter, it may also be open to the judge
to discharge such a juror.  See Crimes Act, 1961, § 374(3) (N.Z.).  However, that section seems in-
tended primarily to deal with jurors who become incapacitated during the trial, rather than those who
are incapacitated when initially called.
129. See TRIAL BY PEERS, supra note 112, at 56.
130. These and other stereotypes were highlighted in the Trial by Peers study, which was based on
both the observation of actual trials and interviews with prosecution and defence counsel.  See id.
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(3)  younger age groups were more likely to serve, while those aged
fifty and over were under-represented; and
(4)  there were fewer than expected unemployed jurors.131
Concern about the results of this study led the Solicitor General to issue an
instruction to Crown Counsel to take whatever steps were necessary to ensure
that Maori men were not challenged disproportionately by the prosecution.
There is no information on the extent to which this instruction has modified
prosecution practice—and it is, of course, unknown how far the under-
representation of this group is actually due to prosecution practice.  However,
regardless of whether the situation has changed, it is likely that there is still a
strong perception amongst Maori,132 and perhaps other groups, that peremptory
challenges have a discriminatory effect and exacerbate the unrepresentative-
ness of juries already produced by the system of disqualifications and excuses.
The rationale for peremptory challenges, especially in the absence of a voir
dire procedure, is questionable.  To the extent that they are used to alter the
socio-demographic composition of the jury so as to produce an outcome fa-
vourable to one party or the other, they are surely unjustified.  Similarly, the
argument133 that peremptory challenges give defendants confidence in the sys-
tem by allowing them to eliminate those whom they do not wish to try the case
is a spurious one:  If they cannot object to a judge in a summary trial, why
should they be able to object to a juror without good grounds for doing so?
The New Zealand Law Commission in its discussion paper has suggested
reducing the number of peremptory challenges to four.  This, it is argued,
would still allow biased jurors to be removed, but would make it more difficult
for either side to influence the representative nature of the jury and select the
jury of their choice.  However, this suggestion appears to be a compromise so-
lution with little merit.  As we have said, the peremptory challenge is at best a
weak and haphazard procedure for removing biased jurors, and it is difficult to
see why a party who has evidence of possible bias should not be required to
challenge for cause and satisfy the court of the grounds for their objection.
Thus, leaving in place a right to exercise four peremptory challenges does not
effectively address the bias issue, and, since it is axiomatic that most minorities
are easier to remove from the jury through a challenging process, it will con-
tinue to undermine jury representativeness.
D. Maori Representation
The issue of Maori representation on juries in New Zealand is a pressing
one for at least two reasons.  In the first place, while we do not know what pro-
                                                          
131. See id. at 67.
132. See generally MOANA JACKSON, NEW ZEALAND DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE MAORI AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: HE WHAIPAANGA HOU—A NEW PERSPECTIVE PART 2, at 138-41
(1988).
133. See LAW REFORM COMM’N OF CANADA, WORKING PAPER 27, THE JURY IN CRIMINAL
TRIALS, 1980, at 54.
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portion of defendants in jury trials are Maori, we do know that Maori are sig-
nificantly over-represented in the convicted population.134  Secondly, in political
terms, the lack of Maori representation on central legal institutions like the jury
forms part of the debate about the need to recognise indigenous forms of jus-
tice and, perhaps, separate legal institutions for Maori.135
Clearly there are a number of levels at which the issue of Maori under-
representation can be tackled.  To date, mainstream concern has focused on
administrative measures designed to ensure that a higher proportion of Maori
are entered on the electoral roll, and hence are available for jury service, and
that the prosecution does not challenge Maori jurors disproportionately.136  Al-
though measures of this sort may have considerable potential to deal with the
extremes of under-representation, so long as the Maori population is charac-
terised by high rates of unemployment, low educational and skill levels, and
high geographical mobility, they are unlikely to provide the whole answer.  Fur-
thermore, attempts to assert control over the process of challenge, whether
through simply exhorting prosecutors to challenge even-handedly or through
banning challenges based on ethnic, gender, or status grounds,137 are not likely
to be successful either.  Faced with the ability of lawyers to find alternative ra-
tionalisations for their challenges, and being in no position to assess them,
judges are unlikely to be either willing or able to police such requirements ef-
fectively.  In our view, the only effective way of controlling peremptory chal-
lenges is to abolish them.
In addition to efforts to improve the selection process, some jurisdictions
have also seen overt judicial attempts to “engineer” the racial composition of
                                                          
134. Although rather more concentrated in the younger age groups, persons identifying themselves
as Maori make up approximately 13% of the New Zealand population.  See STATISTICS NEW
ZEALAND, NEW ZEALAND NOW CRIME TABLES (1996).  However, persons described as Maori ac-
count for roughly 37% of the offenders apprehended by the police, 40% of the total number of non-
traffic criminal cases which are prosecuted,  42% of convicted nontraffic cases, 50% of the male prison
population, and 56% of the female prison population.  See PAULINE SIDDLE, RESPONDING TO
OFFENDING BY MAORI: SOME CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 20 (1996); Juan Tauri & Allison Morris,
Re-forming Justice: The Potential of Maori Processes, 30 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 149, 149
(1997).
135. See, e.g., COURTS CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE COURTS CONSULTATIVE
COMMITTEE ON HE WHAIPAANGA HOU (1991); JACKSON, supra note 132; Tauri & Morris, supra note
134.
136. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON LEGAL SERVICES, NEW ZEALAND DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TE
WHAINGA I TE TIKA: IN SEARCH OF JUSTICE 42 (1986).  See generally COURTS CONSULTATIVE
COMMITTEE, supra note 135.
137. See, for example, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), which is the leading U.S. case hold-
ing race-based challenges to be unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment.  The Supreme Court held that a defendant could overcome the presumption that per-
emptory challenges were used legitimately by making a prima facie case that the challenges in the par-
ticular case were race-motivated, after which the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a neutral
reason for the challenge.  The rule applies regardless of the race of the potential juror or the defen-
dant, Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), to defence as well as to prosecution challenges, Georgia v.
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992), to gender-based challenges, J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994),
and in civil cases, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
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juries so as to match the ethnic background of the accused.138  Even though, in
its usual form, this manipulation tends to consist of relatively minor interfer-
ence designed simply to get some representation on the jury of the group in
question, if it were to be done in New Zealand, it would probably require a
specific legislative amendment.139
In 1993, the U.K. Royal Commission on Criminal Justice recommended
such an amendment.  On the application of the defence or prosecution, and in
exceptional circumstances, a judge would be able to order that a jury include up
to three representatives of racial minority communities.  In addition, counsel
should be able to ask the court to designate that one of the three be of the same
racial background as the accused or the victim.140  As the New Zealand Law
Commission has pointed out in its 1998 discussion paper, this recommendation
fails to address either the issue of representativeness or the lack of jurors of the
same ethnic background as the accused.141  Three jurors randomly selected from
three different minority racial groups will not necessarily render the jury “more
representative,” nor will one juror of the same racial background as either the
accused or the complainant satisfy the demands of the accused for a more ap-
propriate tribunal of fact.  Furthermore, the need to show “exceptional” cir-
cumstances, which the Royal Commission defines as existing only where the
accused can persuade the court that the “unusual and special” features of the
case are such that it is reasonable to believe that the defendant will not get a
fair trial from an all-white jury, suggests that there will be very few cases indeed
in which the procedure would even be arguable let alone available.142
In any case, judicial tinkering of this sort is both undesirable and unneces-
sary.  For one thing, it is likely to compromise the integrity of both the judiciary
and the jury system in the eyes of jurors and of the general public.  For another,
if the concern is with the representativeness of the jury or with whether the jury
adequately reflects the ethnic and cultural background of the accused, then, in
principle, juries should be selected so as to achieve this in all cases—not just
where the accused is Maori.  Any such system would be impracticable and
would, in any event, be unlikely to be much of an improvement on the present
system—for either Maori or other minority groups.  Numbers would inevitably
be small, and ethnic “representatives” would be unlikely to be either represen-
tative or a significant force in the dynamics of the jury.
                                                          
138. The developments in England and Wales in the 1980s reflected a similar problem in the
United Kingdom.  See, e.g., R. v. Broderick, 1970 CRIM. L. REV. 155; R. v. Binns, 1982 CRIM. L. REV.
522 ; R. v. Bansal, 1985 CRIM. L. REV. 151; R. v. Fraser, 1987 CRIM. L. REV. 418; Simon Thomas &
Others, 88 Crim. App. 370 (1989).
139. The English developments were brought to an end by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Ford, 3 All
E.R. 445 (Eng. C.A. 1989), which held that a judge has no common law power either deliberately to
alter the composition of the jury pool or the jury, or to authorise the empanelling of a multi-racial jury.
New Zealand courts would be likely to adopt a similar view.
140. See REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1993, Cm. 2263, at 207-08.
141. See NEW ZEALAND LAW COMM’N, supra note 88, at 73-74.
142. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 140, at 133.
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More significantly, perhaps, we doubt that the current concern with Maori
under-representation would be met by simply ensuring that the jury contains
some Maori jurors or even that it reflects the proportion of Maori in the (local)
community.  Rather, the underlying criticism of the present system is based on
the assertion that Maori defendants can be appropriately judged only by a body
that reflects Maori cultural values and attitudes.  Achieving this result would
require more than one or two Maori jurors on each jury where the defendant is
Maori and, unless it is to be extended to all cultural minorities, would need to
be based on some principled argument derived from the status of Maori as the
indigenous race of New Zealand.  In other words, it is a demand for the revival
of the all-Maori jury, or at least a strong version of the old mixed jury.
The abolition of the right to an all-Maori jury in 1962 was justified on the
basis that New Zealand was governed by “one law for all” and the belief that
under that law no section of the population should receive any “special privi-
leges.”  It was also argued that the right was essentially arbitrary in that it dis-
criminated between defendants whose victims were Maori and those whose vic-
tims were not.143  Maori Members of Parliament and some influential Maori
figures outside Parliament opposed the reform, arguing that the right at least
ensured that Maori values would be taken into account in some cases.  Recent
proponents of reviving the right to an all-Maori jury in all cases where the de-
fendant identifies as Maori base their arguments on a rejection of the “one law
for all” ideology, and of the view that the right constitutes a “privilege” for
Maori.  Hence, in He Whaipaanga Hou, Moana Jackson attempts to develop an
argument for a return to the all-Maori jury based on the right to trial by a jury
of “one’s peers” flowing from Magna Carta and, more significantly, on the
guarantee of Maori rangatiratanga (self-government, self-determination, or
sovereignty) in Article Two of the Treaty of Waitangi.144
However one views the arguments made by Jackson in principle, there are
clearly a number of significant practical difficulties that any such system would
face.  The small and often densely interrelated nature of Maori communities in
many areas, the loss of contact between many Maori and their cultural roots,
and the need to counter majority suspicions of partial juries all present real
problems for any such development.  Furthermore, if one accepts that the
“right” to an all-Maori jury is part of a more general claim to Maori sovereignty
over things Maori, it is difficult to see how one can justify leaving Maori defen-
dants with a choice as to jury composition.  More significantly, however, the no-
tion of an all-Maori jury operating within a court and prosecution structure that
is still almost entirely based upon European values is something of a contradic-
tion in terms and is not in fact the sort of development that Jackson is advo-
cating.  The institution of the jury is itself alien to Maori culture and Maori
law.145  In its modern form, at least, it is a product of centralised, professional,
                                                          
143. See 332 N.Z.P.D., H.R. 2750-51 (1962); 328 N.Z.P.D., H.R. 2840 (1961).
144. See JACKSON, supra note 132, at 259-79.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
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and primarily retributive justice systems.  If the demand by Maori for all-Maori
juries is to make any sense, it can only do so within the context of a discrete
Maori justice system—shaped and informed by Maori values and, perhaps,
those European institutions that Maori regard as appropriate or useful.  It re-
mains unclear whether the jury is likely to be one of those.  What does appear
clear is that if proposals for an alternative Maori criminal justice system were
ever to be taken seriously, changes to the jury structure would be one of the
more minor concerns it would generate.
E. Discharging Jurors
Once a jury is constituted, counsel no longer have the opportunity to chal-
lenge persons off the jury.  However, counsel may apply to the judge to dis-
charge a juror under section 22 of the Juries Act of 1981, or section 374 of the
Crimes Act of 1961.
A judge may discharge a juror who is disqualified from serving as a juror
under the Juries Act of 1981, or who is or gives the appearance of being bi-
ased,146 or who is unable to continue to serve by reason of the illness or death of
a member of the juror’s family.  There is also a broad discretionary power to
discharge a juror who is “incapable” of continuing to serve, for example, be-
cause of some language difficulty or mental or physical incapacity, or because
the juror refuses to perform his or her duty.  The Court of Appeal has stated
that an “incapable” juror includes one whose continued presence on the jury
would jeopardise the fairness of the trial to either side, or make the verdict
abortive or seriously vulnerable.147
In determining whether the entire jury should be discharged on any of the
grounds already mentioned, the judge will primarily consider whether the bias
of one juror has tainted the other jurors, or whether a juror who gives the im-
pression of bias will cause the jury’s verdict to be perceived as unfair.  Deter-
mining whether the jury has been contaminated by an individual juror is a mat-
ter of inference; jurors may not be questioned about discussions between them,
whether in retirement or during the course of the trial.148
No alternate or reserve jurors are selected at the commencement of the
trial.  If a juror is discharged, the court may proceed with eleven jurors, or
fewer than that number if the prosecution and accused consent.  Moreover, un-
der the recently inserted section 374(4A) of the Crimes Act of 1961, the court
may proceed with as few as ten jurors if there are exceptional circumstances
relating to the trial, including, without limitation, the length or expected length
of the trial, and it is in the interests of justice to do so.  The amendment was
made as a direct result of expressions of concern about the possibility that some
                                                          
146. That is, the juror is personally concerned with the facts of the case or is closely connected with
one of the parties or with one of the witnesses or prospective witnesses.  See Crimes Act, 1961,
§i374(3)(d)-(e) (N.Z.); Juries Act, 1981, § 22 (N.Z.).
147. See R. v. M. [1991] 7 C.R.N.Z. 439, 441-42.
148. See R. v. Coombs [1985] 1 N.Z.L.R. 319, 324; R. v. Papadopoulos [1979] 1 N.Z.L.R. 621, 626.
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jurors would fail to cope with and have to be excused from a forthcoming trial,
scheduled to last five months and involving a large number of serious criminal
offences including sexual violation and murder.
At least one commentator has expressed concern publicly about the
amendment and suggested that legislators ought to have considered reserve ju-
ror systems more carefully.149  However, reserve jurors would involve additional
administrative and financial costs and, more importantly, would impose the
burden of jury duty upon a significant number of citizens without generally
permitting them to participate in the decisionmaking process.  When that is set
against the fact that fewer than twelve jurors has been accepted historically
within New Zealand, and that there is no evidence that smaller numbers
(especially ten or eleven instead of twelve) detract from the quality of deci-
sionmaking, the case for introducing reserve jurors is a decidedly weak one.
V
JURY SECRECY AND THE INSCRUTABILITY OF JURY VERDICTS
New Zealand has a tradition of jury secrecy which has been designed to
protect the deliberations of juries in individual cases from outside scrutiny.
However, there is no statutory equivalent of the provisions of the English Con-
tempt of Court Act of 1981 to enforce this tradition.150  Unless the court gives
leave, section 370(2) of the Crimes Act of 1961 does prohibit any communica-
tion with the jury by any person other than the officer of the court who has
charge of them after they have retired to consider their verdict.  A breach of
this prohibition where the communication goes to the merits of the case or
might appear to an onlooker to do so may result in the jury’s discharge and the
declaration of a mistrial or the overturning of the verdict on appeal.151  Beyond
this, the convention is created by case law and broadly enforced in a number of
ways.
In the first place, the courts have firmly established that evidence of jury
discussions, both during the trial and after the jury has retired to consider its
verdict, is inadmissible whether for the purposes of an appeal or otherwise.
Similarly, juries cannot be required to give reasons for their decision, or to in-
dicate or agree on any particular view of the facts.  In other words, although the
jurors can reach a unanimous verdict for radically different reasons and on
quite different interpretations of the facts, they cannot be asked to explain what
those reasons or interpretations are.
Just as importantly, an approach to one or more jurors during or after a trial
may amount to a contempt of court and result in prosecution.152  The issue of
                                                          
149. See Trevor Morley, What About Jury Alternatives?, COUNCIL BRIEF, Mar. 1998, at 6.
150. Contempt of Court Act, 1981, § 8 (Eng.).
151. See R. v. Parkinson [1915] 34 N.Z.L.R. 636, 639; cf. R. v. Davis, 44 Crim. App. 235, 240 (1960).
152. Contempt proceedings are in fact quite rare.  The Solicitor General attempts to work coopera-
tively with the media to establish the parameters of appropriate publication, and prosecutes only when
the case is a serious one and the breach is considered to be a blatant and gross one.
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contempt was considered quite recently153 in the 1993 prosecution of Radio
New Zealand, which had sought to interview jurors about their reaction to the
discovery of new evidence after the trial and whether, if this new evidence had
been available, it would have affected their verdict.  Holding Radio New Zea-
land in contempt, the High Court noted that such behaviour was likely to injure
the administration of justice both by removing the protection of confidentiality
from jury deliberations and by weakening community confidence in jury ver-
dicts.  The Court also stated that publicity about jury deliberations would im-
pede frank discussions amongst jurors through fear of subsequent exposure to
public criticism or ridicule, and might discourage juries from bringing in un-
popular verdicts.
Compelling though the reasons for jury secrecy have been, it has until now
been a significant obstacle in the path of jury reform.  It is frequently argued
that jury decisionmaking is problematic: that many jurors have difficulty in un-
derstanding the law and in following or assimilating complex or technical evi-
dence; that some jurors tend to dominate deliberations; and that intimidation
within the jury room of jurors with minority opinions is commonplace.  Yet
these assertions are based on mere anecdote; the shroud of jury secrecy has
prevented the collection of systematic information about how New Zealand ju-
ries really operate.154
This mystery shrouding the New Zealand jury is now dissipating.  With the
full support of the government and the judiciary, two of the authors are in the
process of undertaking, in collaboration with the New Zealand Law Commis-
sion, a research project on jury decisionmaking that involves interviews with ju-
rors in a sample of fifty trials throughout the country about not only their own
approach to and understanding of the issues in the case, but also the collective
deliberations of the jury.  It is intended that the results from this study will in-
form the Law Commission’s report to the government on possible reforms to
the jury system, and in particular will provide an empirical basis for recom-
mendations on how to both enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of jury de-
cisionmaking and reduce or eliminate any prejudice arising from pretrial or
trial publicity.
The New Zealand Law Commission has also suggested that the law regard-
ing jury secrecy should be clarified through codification.  It has argued in its
draft Evidence Code155 that the rigorous enforcement of jury secrecy may some-
times conceal a miscarriage of justice, and that, while evidence of jury delibera-
tions concerning the substance of the case should generally remain inadmissi-
ble, evidence disclosing irregularities in the conduct of the deliberations—for
                                                          
153. See Solicitor-Gen. v. Radio N.Z. [1993] 10 C.R.N.Z. 641.
154. Similar criticisms have been made of the Contempt of Court Act, 1981 (Eng.), which has effec-
tively barred academic research into jury decisionmaking in that country.  See, e.g., REPORT OF THE
ROYAL COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 140, at 2; Penny Darbyshire, The Lamp That
Shows That Freedom Lives—Is It Worth the Candle?, 1991 CRIM. L. REV. 740, 751.
155. This Evidence Code is as yet unpublished and subject to change following a consultation proc-
ess presently being undertaken.
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example, intimidation of a juror during deliberations—should be admissible
when it may disclose such a miscarriage.
Beyond this codification, however, the New Zealand Law Commission has
not suggested any liberalisation of the law on jury secrecy.  For example, it has
rejected submissions from journalists, who have contended that the media
should be able to interview jurors following a trial about the experience of be-
ing a juror, as distinct from interviewing jurors about their deliberations.  In
fact, there is no reason to believe that the former constitutes a threat to the
functioning of the jury system, and it is unclear whether it even constitutes con-
tempt of court under the existing law.156  This confusion demonstrates that the
law in this area is decidedly vague.  That, at least, has been recognised by the
Commission, which has recommended that legislation should clarify the cir-
cumstances under which media contact with consenting jurors after trial is
permissible.
VI
THE JURY TRIAL PROCESS
A. Hung Juries and Majority Verdicts
Jury verdicts in favour of conviction or acquittal must be unanimous.  Pro-
vided that the jury has been deliberating for at least four hours,157 it may be dis-
charged if the court believes that it is unlikely to reach agreement.  In that
event, a new trial will generally be ordered, subject to the Solicitor General’s
power to stay proceedings.  However, if the jury reports that it is having diffi-
culty in agreeing, it will usually be given a direction to try again.  That direction
(known as a Papadopoulos direction) incorporates words to the following ef-
fect:
One of the strengths of the jury system is that each member takes into the jury room
his or her individual experience and wisdom and is expected to judge the evidence
fairly and impartially in that light.  You are expected to pool your views of the evi-
dence and you have a duty to listen carefully to one another.  Remember that a view
honestly held can equally honestly be changed.  So, within the oath, there is scope for
discussion, argument and give and take.  That is often the way in which in the end
unanimous agreement is reached.
But, of course, no-one should be false to his or her oath.  No-one should give in
merely for the sake of agreement or to avoid inconvenience.  If in the end you hon-
estly cannot agree, after trying to look at the case calmly and objectively and weigh-
ing carefully the opinions of others, you must say so.  If regrettably that is the final
position, you will be discharged and in all probability there will have to be a new trial
before another jury.
                                                          
156. For an example of a journalistic account of the experience of being a juror, see Llewelyn Rich-
ards, Two Trials in One, NORTH AND SOUTH, Nov. 1997, at 28.  There seems to have been no sugges-
tion that this article, which provides details of the jury discussion in a rape case, might amount to con-
tempt.
157. See Crimes Act, 1961, § 374(2) (N.Z.).
CAMERON.FMT3.DOC 08/02/99  4:09 PM
132 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 62: No. 2
Therefore I am asking you, as is usual in such cases, to be good enough to retire
again and see whether you can reach a unanimous verdict in the light of what I have
said.158
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the length of jury deliberations has in-
creased significantly in recent years.159  However, there is no reliable evidence
on deliberation time and whether it has in fact increased.  What is more certain
is that trials involving jury disagreements (“hung juries”) have increased in re-
cent years, both numerically and in proportionate terms.160  Some of the recent
hung juries, too, have occurred in particularly high-profile and lengthy trials,
and have attracted considerable media comment.  In particular, the prosecution
of a Wellington businessman, John Barlow, on two charges of murder, resulted
in two hung juries and a conviction at his third trial; each trial lasted for ap-
proximately four weeks.
Not surprisingly, this trend has prompted calls for majority verdicts, similar
to those permitted in England and Wales and a number of Australian states.161
In fact, as far back as 1984, the then-Minister of Justice, in response to a per-
ceived increase in the number of jury disagreements, suggested that the idea of
majority verdicts deserved serious consideration.  Now the New Zealand Law
Commission has stated its provisional view that, if current rates of hung juries
are either maintained or increased during 1998 until the time that it publishes
its final report, it will recommend introducing majority verdicts.
The problem in assessing the merits of majority verdicts is that we have no
reliable evidence on the nature of hung juries or the reasons why they might be
increasing.  Majority verdicts are often mooted on the assumption that hung ju-
ries result from the obstinacy of one or two irrational “rogue” jurors who hold
out against the reasoned views of the majority.  That assumption, however, is
unproven.  If it is instead the case that minority jurors rarely stick to their view
without some initial support and that hung juries usually occur when there is a
substantial division of initial opinion amongst jurors,162 the case for majority
verdicts becomes considerably weaker.  The nature of the deliberation process
and the reasons for jury disagreements are being explored in the empirical re-
search on jury decisionmaking that we are currently undertaking.163  Until the
                                                          
158. R. v. Accused [1988] 2 N.Z.L.R. 46, 59.
159. See, for example, the comments of the Court of Appeal in R. v. Hapeta [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 6, 10.
160. In 1997, there was considerable public and political concern, inspired in part by the release of
John Goulter’s book No Verdict: New Zealand’s Hung Jury Crisis, supra note 1, over-reports that the
rate of hung juries had increased rapidly from 4% or so in 1991 to 10% in 1997.  This 10% figure sub-
sequently proved to be somewhat misleading.  While the rate of hung juries has certainly increased in
the last decade or so, the most recent figures available show that, in 1997, only 3.8% of all cases com-
mitted for trial resulted in a jury disagreement on all charges.  See Unpublished Statistics for 1992 to
1997, Business Information Section, Dep’t for Courts, Wellington (on file with authors).
161. See, e.g., Michael Chesterman, Criminal Trial Juries in Australia: From Penal Colonies to a
Federal Democracy, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 91-93 (Spring 1999).
162. Overseas research evidence provides some support for this proposition.  See, e.g., VALERIE
HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 168 (1986).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 154-155.
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findings of that research have been reported and properly considered, it is un-
likely that any change to the current unanimity requirement will be made.
B. Assisting Jury Deliberations
Although there is no direct systematic evidence on how well juries perform
their task in New Zealand, there is anecdotal information that suggests that ju-
ries sometimes misunderstand or misapply the law, become confused about the
facts, draw unwarranted inferences or conclusions from them, or take irrele-
vancies into account.  These problems are more often associated with lengthy
or complex trials and are said to arise not only from the varying educational
and intellectual levels of jurors, but also from deficiencies in the way in which
they are prepared for their role and in which the facts and the law are pre-
sented to them.
There is some overseas research evidence about the extent and causes of
such problems, but it is mostly derived from studies of mock or shadow juries164
or from self-report questionnaires filled in by actual jurors after the trial.165  We
therefore do not know the degree to which these problems even exist, let alone
the reasons for them.166
However, to the extent that there are problems attributable to court proce-
dure, it might be expected that improvement in the quality of the information
presented to juries and the aids provided to them during the trial would go
some way toward mitigating those problems.  In recent years, therefore, this
area has received considerable attention.  The process of reform began in 1992,
when the Courts Consultative Committee167 published a report entitled Jurors’
Concerns and the Jury System, which reviewed the facilities, information, and
services provided to jurors and made recommendations for change.  Since then,
a number of improvements to the facilities, information, and services provided
to jurors have been gradually introduced.  For example, every jury summons
sent to potential jurors now includes standard information dealing with such
subjects as the functions of juries, the selection process, and the duties of ju-
rors.168  In addition, the Department for Courts has prepared a booklet, entitled
Information for Jurors, which is available to jurors when they first arrive at
court and in the jury room.  It deals with the subject matters covered in the
summons form in more detail, as well as some additional matters jurors need to
                                                          
164. See, e.g., REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983); David Rosenhan et al., Notetaking
Can Aid Juror Recall, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53 (1994).
165. See, e.g., MICHAEL ZANDER & PAUL HENDERSON, ROYAL COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STUDY NO. 19, CROWN COURT STUDY, 1993, at 249.
166. A gap which our current research on jury decisionmaking, described supra text accompanying
notes 154-155, is designed to fill.
167. The Courts Consultative Committee is a committee of judges, lawyers, and officials estab-
lished in 1986 to advise the Minister of Justice on the operation of all aspects of the court system.
168. The information in the summons form is set out under various question headings such as
“What is a jury?,” “How was I chosen for jury service?,” and “What happens if I do not report to
court?”
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consider, such as choosing a jury representative169 and the need for confidenti-
ality.  The booklet includes a glossary of terms commonly used in criminal pro-
ceedings.  The Department has also prepared a short introductory video for ju-
rors covering similar matters.  Although the video is not always used, both the
booklet and video are distributed throughout New Zealand jury courts.
At the start of a trial, judges may make introductory remarks to the jury.  It
is not uncommon at this preliminary stage for judges to instruct the jury on, for
example, the prosecution’s burden of proof and the need for the jurors to set
aside any feelings of sympathy or prejudice.  However, there is some variation
in the extent to which this instruction occurs.  The prosecution’s opening ad-
dress covers the charges against the defendant and a summary of the facts that
the prosecution intends to prove.  Section 367 of the Crimes Act of 1961 envis-
ages that the defence will not open its case until the prosecution has presented
its evidence and prosecution witnesses have been cross-examined.  There is
case law suggesting that section 367 precludes the defence from making an
opening statement following the prosecution’s.170  Despite this, some judges do
allow defence counsel the opportunity to make an opening statement, which
the defence is free to decline.  The defence’s opening statement may define the
issues without analysing the evidence.
Once both sides have presented their evidence, cross-examined witnesses,
and given closing addresses, the judge will not only give directions to the jury
about the relevant law, but also sum up and make limited comment on the fac-
tual evidence presented by both sides.  Judicial directions are given at this stage
on such matters as the prosecution’s burden and standard of proof, the rele-
vance of circumstantial evidence, the defendant’s right of silence, and the jury’s
use of exhibits.  Judges have access to what is known as a bench-book, con-
taining guidelines on some of the more commonly used instructions as well as
other trial matters.  However, they make varying use of it.171  Some prefer to
formulate their own instructions, others use the bench-book as a guide on sub-
stance but not on style, and yet others follow the model directions more closely.
The foreword indicates that it is entirely a matter for individual judges to de-
termine the extent to which they make use of the bench-book.  In general, the
New Zealand Court of Appeal’s approach to jury directions has been to en-
courage brevity.
Jurors are able to ask questions of the witnesses during the trial by for-
warding the questions in writing to the judge, who determines whether the
                                                          
169. The jury representative is otherwise known as the “foreman.”  The term “jury representative”
is used in the booklet Information for Jurors.
170. See R. v. Joseph [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 702, 703-04.  Hammond, J., further noted that he doubted
that Parliament intended to give the defence both the advantage of blunting the prosecution’s opening
statement and the last word in the closing addresses.  See id.
171. The current bench-book for New Zealand judges was produced in 1994 by judges of the High
Court and District Court, with the assistance of the then-Department of Justice.  Parts of it have been
updated subsequently, and it currently is being reviewed.  The bench-book contains guidance on pre-
trial applications and other procedural matters as well as practice notes, advice on summing up, and
model directions.
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questions will be put.  However, this practice is rare and is not encouraged in
the information supplied to potential and selected jurors; in fact, the Informa-
tion for Jurors booklet describes this practice as “most unusual.”172  The jury
may also ask the judge questions during deliberations.
While hearing the evidence, individual jurors can take notes and refer to
them in the course of deliberations.  The jury is given a copy of the indictment
and exhibits, and sometimes of the relevant statutory offence provisions that
can be taken to the jury room.  Transcripts of videotaped police interviews with
defendants are technically exhibits and often are provided to the jury as the
videotape is being shown.  However, they are normally recovered before delib-
eration commences.  The trial transcript—the record of all the evidence—is
never given to the jury.  Instead, the jury may ask to have passages of the tran-
script read out in open court during the course of deliberations.  Juries are
never given written copies of either the judge’s directions or counsel’s closing
addresses, although during deliberations the jury may ask for the judge’s direc-
tions on a particular topic to be given again orally, and enlarged upon or clari-
fied.  Where the complexity of the case warrants it, the Court of Appeal has
approved the use (including during deliberations) of charts and summaries
supplementing oral presentation.173
Despite these strategies for enhancing jury decisionmaking, it is arguable
that jurors still find particular aspects of trial procedure difficult or confusing,
and that much more could still be done to improve the quality of the decision-
making process.  For example, greater use of visual aids or written material
could significantly improve the comprehensibility of the evidence; despite some
use of such devices in complex cases, evidence and instructions are still pre-
sented largely in oral form and require concentration for lengthy periods of
time by jurors who may be quite unused to assimilating information imparted
in this form.  Jurors could also be given more advice about how to undertake
their functions—for example, how to select a foreman and how to structure
their decisionmaking—since they are largely left to their own devices at pres-
ent.  Similarly, the judge could encourage them to depart from their role as pas-
sive participants in the process by specifically telling them that they can and
should ask questions, both during the trial and at the conclusion of the sum-
ming up, in order to clarify points of fact or law about which they are uncertain.
We expect that the findings of our current research project will enable us to
make some assessment of the possible impact of these sorts of reforms.
                                                          
172. The New Zealand Law Commission has recommended an express provision in its proposed
Evidence Code codifying the right of jurors to ask questions through the judge, but it may be doubted
whether this in itself will make the practice more common.
173. See, e.g., R. v. Egden [Feb. 17, 1995] Court of Appeal, CA 211/94, at 5-6 (unreported).
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VII
PRETRIAL PUBLICITY AND PREJUDICE
In the absence of a voir dire procedure for jury selection in New Zealand, it
is virtually impossible to eliminate from the jury those who might be prejudiced
as a result of prior knowledge of the case.174  Given this problem, it might be
expected that the courts would have imposed stringent controls on the nature
and extent of pretrial publicity, so as to minimise the likelihood that bias will
arise on that account.  In fact, however, this is not the case.  Although the rules
relating to pretrial and trial publicity are more restrictive than those in the
United States, the media are nevertheless generally free to report on pretrial
court proceedings.  Such reporting includes, in the case of charges laid on in-
dictment and proceeding to a jury trial, the preliminary hearing at which the
prosecution’s evidence is presented in order to determine whether there is a
prima facie case.  Name suppression also is granted only infrequently (although
more often prior to trial than subsequent to it), and rarely on the ground that it
will prejudice the subsequent trial.
Improper or inaccurate reporting of court proceedings, or the publication of
material reflecting on the character and credibility of the accused, may amount
to contempt of court.  So too may any other publicity about any aspect of the
investigation, the arrest and charging of the suspect, or the evidence in the case,
which may suggest that the accused committed the offence or which otherwise
may prejudice the chances of a fair trial.  The test, however, is a vague and ar-
guably an unduly liberal one:  In striving for a balance between the freedom of
the press and the accused’s right to a fair trial, the courts have in fact created a
presumption in favour of the former, which can be rebutted in contempt pro-
ceedings only by proof to the criminal standard that there is a “real risk”175 or a
“substantial risk,”176 as distinct from a remote possibility, of interference with a
fair trial.  Thus, they have not found contempt or unfairness in circumstances
where there has been a significant lapse of time between the publication and
the trial or where the circulation of the publication has been in an area 200
kilometres from the area in which the trial is to take place.177
Not surprisingly, contempt proceedings in such circumstances are rare.  The
vagueness of the test, and the difficulty in identifying when publication might
amount to contempt, encourages media reporting in borderline cases.  It is not
uncommon, for example, for the media to report that a defendant arrested for a
particular offence was already on bail on other charges.  Furthermore, the de-
velopment in recent years of a more competitive news market has likely con-
tributed to this process, with television in particular being more prepared to
push the limits than previously.178
                                                          
174. See supra text accompanying note 127.
175. Solicitor-Gen. v. Wellington Newspapers Ltd. [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 45, 47.
176. R. v. Coghill [1995] 3 N.Z.L.R. 651, 662.
177. See Gisborne Herald Ltd. v. Solicitor-Gen. [1995] 3 N.Z.L.R. 563, 568.
178. For example, in a recent paper, the Solicitor-General, John McGrath QC, has commented that
CAMERON.FMT3.DOC 08/02/99  4:09 PM
Page 103: Spring 1999] NEW ZEALAND 137
Apart from preventing inappropriate pretrial publicity through the law of
contempt, the effects of such publicity also may be mitigated by changing the
venue of the trial to an area where potential jurors are less likely to have been
exposed to it.179  However, applications for change of venue are granted only
sparingly, and even where the possibility of prejudice seems fairly clear, the
courts are notably reluctant to accede to such requests.  For example, in R. v.
Parsons,180 the Court of Appeal upheld a decision to refuse a change of venue
where a son was charged with killing his father, a prominent local businessman,
despite significant local media coverage of the charge and of the fact that bail
had been denied at least partly on the basis of affidavits from the police and
from the family detailing concerns that the accused would abscond or would at-
tempt to intimidate witnesses if bailed.  The court professed itself satisfied that
there was no “real risk” that this publicity would preclude a fair and impartial
trial, and noted that the refusal of bail and publication of the reasons for it oc-
curred some fifteen months before the trial was scheduled to commence.
Given that counsel cannot question potential jurors in order to explore the pos-
sibility that some prejudice may still linger, and bearing in mind the likely lack
of impact of warnings to the jury not to let such publicity intrude on their deci-
sionmaking,181 the court’s reluctance to order a change of venue in such cases
seems unduly risky.  Coupled with vague, uncertain contempt laws, and an in-
creasingly rampant market-driven media, defendants in New Zealand do ap-
pear likely to be at an increasing risk of prejudice with little or no opportunity
to detect its existence, let alone combat it.
The New Zealand Law Commission has suggested the enactment of a statu-
tory offence of contempt, applying to publicity that occurs where the com-
mencement of proceedings is highly likely and that results in a substantial risk
of prejudice to a fair trial.  It has also suggested that there should be a “public
interest” defence, of the type proposed by the Australian Law Reform Com-
mission, where the publisher can show:
(1)  that the publication was made in good faith, in the course of “a
continuing public discussion of a matter of public affairs (other than
                                                          
over the last fifteen years the conventional acceptance of the media that it needs to function
in a way that protects the needs of the criminal justice system has come under pressure.
Some would argue it is no longer workable.  This attitudinal change appears, to this observer,
to be due to the emergence of real competition in the news market, in itself linked to the cor-
poratisation of State television and the arrival of TV3 as a competing private broadcaster.
LEGAL RESEARCH FOUNDATION SEMINAR, CONTEMPT AND THE MEDIA: CONSTITUTIONAL
SAFEGUARD OR STATE CENSORSHIP? 23 (1998).
179. See Crimes Act, 1961, § 322 (N.Z.).  On adverse publicity as a ground, see R. v. Brown [1987] 3
C.R.N.Z. 132 (C.A.), and R. v. Holdem [1987] 3 C.R.N.Z. 103 (H.C.).
180. [July 19, 1995] Court of Appeal, CA 127/95 (unreported).
181. Most of the empirical research on the impact of judicial instructions to ignore prejudicial ma-
terial suggests that they are largely ineffective in achieving their objectives.  Indeed, in many cases,
judicial commentary may well exacerbate the problem by focusing jurors’ attention on the prejudicial
material.  For an overview, see HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 162; J. Alexander Tanford, The Law and
Psychology of Jury Instructions, 69 NEB. L. REV. 71 (1990).
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the trial itself), or otherwise of general public interest and impor-
tance”; and
(2)  that “the discussion would have been significantly impaired if
the statement creating a substantial risk of prejudice to the relevant
trial had not been published at the time when it was published.”182
It has to be said, though, that the proposed statutory offence would do little
to promote greater certainty in the law or to curb unwarranted publicity.  Part
of the difficulty arises from the fact that the nature of the “public interest” in
potentially prejudicial pretrial publicity has not been clearly articulated either
in court decisions or in the Law Commission’s discussion of the issue.  While
publicity about some matters relating to the charge or the defendant may occa-
sionally be desirable—for example, to obtain evidence or to prevent suspicion
falling on others—it is difficult to see why the public generally has an “interest”
in the publication of material which has the potential, however slight, to preju-
dice a fair trial.
VIII
CONCLUSION
It is certainly the case that in New Zealand, as in many other common law
jurisdictions, the recent history of the jury has been one of fairly steady decline.
This is particularly so of the civil jury which, for all practical purposes, now has
become virtually extinct with little realistic prospect of revival.  In the criminal
area, the extension of jury trial to the District Court produced a brief resur-
gence, but the previous trends seem now to have largely reasserted themselves.
Again, as with other jurisdictions, the pressures have been largely fiscal but,
given the opportunity, defendants have shown no great enthusiasm for jury trial
either.
Nevertheless the jury has retained a large part of its historic role as an
ideological centrepiece of New Zealand criminal justice.  In spite of the percep-
tion in some quarters of a “hung jury crisis” and a corresponding interest in
moving toward majority verdicts, there is no constituency at all for radical
change or even for any significant restriction on the right to jury trial.  At the
most, there are occasional calls for a reconsideration of the availability of jury
trial in complex or very lengthy cases, which can be accommodated with only
relatively minor adjustments.183  In addition, it is important to note that emerg-
ing concerns in New Zealand about wrongful or dubious convictions in a num-
ber of recent cases focus largely on failings in the investigatory and prosecution
processes rather than on any failings in the jury or trial system.
On the other hand, New Zealand is currently in the throes of a series of de-
velopments designed to improve jury selection processes (particularly in rela-
tion to Maori jurors), upgrade jury facilities, enhance juror education, and pro-
                                                          
182. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT NO. 35, CONTEMPT, 1987, at 175.
183. See supra text following note 103; supra text following note 173.
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vide appropriate assistance, both during the hearing and in the decisionmaking
phase.  The New Zealand Law Commission also is considering these issues, and
to assist it in this task, an extensive piece of research is being undertaken on
District and High Court juries.  This research, which is largely the result of an
initiative by the judiciary, is focusing on jury competence, the impact of pretrial
and trial publicity, juror responses to complex, expert, or potentially prejudicial
evidence, the dynamics of the decisionmaking process, and the impact of cur-
rent attempts to improve jurors understanding of their role and of the trial.
The concern of all this effort is primarily to ensure that, whether the actual use
of the criminal jury continues to decline, it will remain as a central plank in the
ideology of criminal justice in New Zealand, effectively symbolising a number
of traditional values.  How far these efforts will succeed and how significant the
values traditionally associated with the jury will turn out to be in the future, is
another question.
